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ABSTRACT

The variety of culturally-constituted conceptions of self are investigated in this essay. A history of ethnopsychology is given which includes an examination of evolutionist and sociological theories of the self in relation to culture and society. Various approaches to ethnopsychology are considered, and different facets of the self are explored. A discussion of the nature of the self-concept in different cultural settings is organized by focal issues, such as the boundaries of the self, its relation to the body, feelings, the group, and other issues. Cases which illustrate the variety of cultural conceptions of the self are cited from studies done in Japan, Melanesia, Bali, Santa Isobel, Eastern Nepal, and India, and with the Northern Cheyenne, the Maori, Eskimos, and the Tswana of Southern Africa. Ethno-theories of development are explored using cases which suggest variability among indigenous models of psychological development. Cases in this section are illustrated in greater depth and include examples from Hindu India, the Marquesas Islands, and the Northern Cheyenne culture. It is noted that the self has ties to a society's kinship structure, culturally salient role assignments, history, conceptions of time, religious beliefs, economic factors, and characteristic cognitive styles. Implications for future research are discussed. A nine-page bibliography is appended. (NRB)

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INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES OF SELF AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

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Van Leer Project on
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The kind of detailed ethnographic observation that anthropologists make can lead to an understanding of evolving forms of interaction - to nascent institutions that may be encouraged by social planning. If planned programs can be constructed to emulate or develop these spontaneous arrangements among people, they are more likely to be acceptable and effective.

(Margaret Clark, 1973, p. 86)

Culture has no more profound influence than its power to shape the self. To have an idea of oneself is a prerequisite for social life. Self carries within itself a reflection of beliefs about reality, replete with implicit and formulated theories about what a person is, how time is shaped, how events are caused, and what significant "things" populate the universe. One's idea of oneself cannot be divorced from prevailing cultural beliefs of what a person is.

This essay is an investigation into the variety of culturally-constituted conceptions of self, a subset of larger ethnopsychologies. Such an investigation is bound to raise more questions than it can answer, and some enduring philosophical issues reappear. However, there is no intent here to settle on what is "true" as distinct from what appears to "make sense" to the enthnographers or their informants, for the point of interest is the expressive variability of human psychological life.

After an abbreviated history of ethnopsychology to set the stage and a consideration of approaches, various facets of self will be discussed. The first is the nature of the self-concept in different cultural settings. This discussion will be organized by focal issues, such as the boundaries of the self, its relation to the body, feelings, the group, and other issues. Cases will provide examples of various cultural "positions". The last focal issues are ethno-theories of development. This area has seen little study of a psychological nature, and cases chosen are intended to suggest variability among indigenous models of psychological development. This portion will be organized around a limited number of cases illustrated in greater depth, and not around issues posed by differences among them.

Like the psychological referent of the term, as a field of study, "self" has no clear demarcations, and the range of relevent topics is endless. The issues discussed do not aspire to be comprehensive, nor even "representative" of all ethnographic work in the area. Primary material used was chosen for depth, sophistication, and diversity. As "cases" used to illustrate various points, the data are necessarily condensed and abbreviated, limiting the range of connections which might be made at different levels of cultural organization. Drawing the line around the self is ultimately arbitrary, and it is hoped the reader will refer to the original ethnographies.

A last word about terminology: words like "self," "self-concept", "self-representation", and "identity" are used somewhat loosely and interchangeably, for the reason that the material discussed tends to raise questions about the possibility of arriving at a denotation of self adequate for scientific purposes without sacrificing descriptive accuracy. This will become evident in the text.

Although the problem of the anthropology of the self has a relatively long tradition, it has progressed in fits and starts. Tyler and other "evolutionists" viewed individuals as operating independently of social and cultural reality. Society was itself a sort of macro projection of individual psychologies. Early German social scientists, such as Lazarus and Steinthal, considered history, tradition and 'folk ideas' as significant factors in the development of a collective mind and identity, which remained at its heart a sort of "methodological individualism" (Fogelson, 1980). Features of collective representation were understood with reference to individual psychological functions.

Within the French sociological tradition, especially among Durkheim and his intellectual followers, Mauss and Radin, was an emphasis on the superordinate status of society. The individual self was seen as a product of society, and differences of individual consciousness were thought to be linked to the degree of differentiation within the society. Thus, an ostensible and relative lack of consciousness of self among 'primitives' could be seen as a product of a type of larger system. Though Durkheim recognized the presence among primitives of an individual ego rooted "inside the skin", it was subservient to an ego conditioned by outside forces. Individual and collective representations were effectively inseparable. Following Durkheim, philosopher Lucien Levi-Bruhl felt primitive people could not articulate a bounded and unitary sense of self due to the use of the "law of participation" by which an individual's boundaries extended to "appurtenaces such as secretions, excreta, tracks, imprints, remains of food, garments, weapons..." (1928, p. 152) and more, the boundaries of self must be seen as indefinate. Such relics of a person, he argued, were "...ingral parts of the individual" (p. 153). Furthermore, the primitive individual is constituted through identity with the departed ancestors (p. 153);

> The individual is only himself by nature of being at the same time something other than himself. Viewed in this fresh aspect, far from being one unit, as we conceive him to be, he is one and yet several at the same time. Thus he is, so to speak, a veritable "centre of participation.[4]

If such approaches succeeded in avoiding the methodological individualism of the British and German traditions, they tended to reify society: the individual barely remained a useful unit of analysis. The individual self as a meaningful focus of attention may have been neglected due to the "arm-chair" nature of the theorists' methods. None had done direct fieldwork. In his close analysis of Melanesians of New Caledonia with whom he lived, Maurice Leenhardt introduced a deep and subtle analysis of a single case, exposing particulars of the indigenous view of self. Like Levi-Bruhl, he found a diffuseness in the sense of self, a self constituted by and at the intersection of various names given an individual. At center, he remained a hollow channel, not the monadic self of Aristotelean introspection. Although Leenhardt felt the Melanesian self arose by a "participation" with extrinsic relations, the familiarity gained through twenty-five years of contact allowed him to place his subjects in a specific psychological and cultural milieu. The New Caledonians could be understood in their uniqueness, not as exemplars of the class of "primitive people". His approach signalled a shift away from the psychological study of culture to an ethnographic study of psychology.

A number of American ethnographers made the self a focal object of attention. Rather than seek generalizations based on encyclopedic comparative sutdies, Hallowell (1955) tried to understand the self within each unique cultural context. His concept of the "behavioral environment" provided

a way to relate the particulars of an individual's world to self. Self, he claimed, was both a universal and a cultural product. For Hallowell, what is necessary is not to compare primitive with modern mentality. First, one must understand self as an adaptation to a unique set of circumstances. In this way can the meaning of behavior and its relation to the self-concept be illuminated.

Contemporary American ethnographers have retained and enlivened this concern with the influence of an individual's belief about himself on experience. While acknowledging the impossibility of fully getting into a natives "skin", Geertz (1966, 1975) seeks to understand the meaning of experience which, he claims, is mediated by symbols provided by culture, therefore rendering it accessible to interpretation. The goal is (1975, p. 224)

> ...to grasp concepts which, for another people are experience-near, and to do so well enough to place them in illuminating connection with experience-distant concepts theorists have fashioned to capture the general features of social life...

In her study of Ilongot headhunting, Rosaldo (1980) seeks to connect aspects of self with larger cultural features. Others, like Levy (1973) and Hay (1977) apply psychoanalytic concepts to ethnopsychologies to reveal the potential unity of culture in underlying psychic processes. Sudhir Kakar (1968, 1979, N.D.), an American trained Indian psychoanalyst, uses a combination of observation of the active and the normative models of ancient medical, poetic and religious texts to arrive at an explication of indigenous conceptions of life stages.

The French sociological tradition has contributed to the study of the self among American social scientists. For George Herbert Mead (1932, P. xxii)

mind "...is the presence in behavior of significant symbols. It is the internalization within the individual of the social process of communication in which meaning emerges." Its genesis is originally outside the individual. Selfhood arises as one comes to take oneself as an object, much as one might take the role of another and look back at oneself. It is only by contrast to the social - or "objective", as Mead would have it - that the individual is contrasted as such. Mead was the founder of the symbolic interactionists, including Erving Goffman (1962, 1971, 1973), who emphasized the representation of self in roles played in social interaction. Self, within this tradition, is to be grasped in the rule-bound and role-bound negotiation of status in face-to-face contact. His analyses are concerned with real situations, and not at all the "real person" beneath the mask.

This selective history illustrates a lingering tension within the anthropological study of self. There is yet no consensus on the epistemological status of self. Though it is affirmed by many as a universal, studies which link the self with socio-cultural systems argue for its ultimate plasticity. Taken in all its variability within particular contexts, it evades "grounding" in any clearly established immutable and underlying human nature. If cultural forms have yet to be shown to rest on human necessity, symbolic representations of self (the only signs by which self is made available for study) too, must be matters of local convention. Is self to be treated as an objective natural fact for scientific analysis, and its variable forms of representation a mere veneer atop an enduring psychological substrate? Or are indigenous ideas about self a fundamental constituent of psychological reality itself?

These questions may yet be revealed as miscast, for this area of inquiry is still in its infancy. The anthropological study of self is emerging as a field in the stage of "natural history", wherein the primary task is the cataloguing and description of various cases, initially to "investigate, in their own right, self concepts that have developed independently from Western influence," (Fogelson, 1980, p. 1) to highlight premature assumptions about the applicability of Western conceptions of self, to "...reestablish whether an indigenous formation is grounded in psychological nature or in the sociocultural" (Paul Heelas, p. 53) and only then, move toward a conception of the basic "structural form of the mind" (Cassirer, 1955). If our Western conceptions have provided an interpretive backdrop for ethnographic studies of culture, we must now establish an appreciation of ethnopsychologies as a backdrop to our own theorizing about human potential.

If the self-concept varies profoundly across cultures (as will be demonstrated later), in what sense is it a universal category of human experience? Clifford Geertz asked if religion existed universally, and answered, in effect, yes, if you define it broadly enough. The category of "self" is similarly ambiguous in its domain. Such a broad definition is at risk for becoming meaningless and losing analytic precision. However, an essentialistic (or "monothetic") definition may preclude our consideration of self as it is variously expressed. Any consideration of self must begin with a working sense of the "thing" that most closely corresponds with our word "self", effectively operating from a perspective of "latent universalism".

Some idea of self must necessarily be anterior to the study of self, which will in turn force a reconsideration of the category. In a rather backward fashion, the present exploration, too, will consider the boundary and criteria problem of the self-category within its use by ethnographers and their subjects. They, after all, have taken positions.

Given the elusiveness of the concept of self, why be bothered with a search for universals at all? According to Rodney Needham (1981, p. 73), without an idea of human nature we risk attributing to members of other traditions states or capacities they may not possess, or denying them any likeness to ourselves: such a perspective might be used to rationalize social evil ("they're not citizens, only slaves" or "they don't value life the way we do").

Though the boundaries cannot be defined in advance, considerable use has been made of Hallowell's unequivocal claim about certain genetic traits of selfhood. He claims that "self-awareness is a psychological constant, one basic facet of human nature and of human personality" (1955, p. 75). As with Mead, selfhood, as a distinguishing trait, exists in one's capacity to be an object to oneself. This split in the self is necessarily mediated by symbolic representations. One symbolic form, language, as Sapir (1949) noted, is a potent factor in the growth of individuality. For example, among all languages he studied, Boas found pronouns distinguishing between the individual as speaker, the individual spoken to, and the individual spoken of. The consequence of the symbolic mediation of this split in the self is that to have a self is to have an <u>idea</u> of the self. As David Bohm (1973, p. 102) wrote, "...a model of the self does not remain a mere model ...it actually becomes the self." Or Seymour Epstein (1973, p. 407),

> ...The self-concept is a self-theory. It is a theory that the individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an experiencing, functioning individual, and is part of a broader theory which he holds with respect to his entire range of significant experience.

Applying this notion of self-concept as theory allows certain kinds of analysis to take place, for, as Orville Brim (1976, p. 244) said, "Any theory, formally defined, has properties separate from its substance...." For instance, we can relate the symbolic form used in self-representation to other institutions in the larger culture, such as social structure, religion, and the like.

A more significant implication of this self-objectifying process is that the terms used are provided by culture. Hallowell (1955, p. 80) states

> In cross cultural perspective...and at the level of phenomenological description, the fact remains that human beings do function in terms of concepts of self which, in part, are culturally derived.

Therefore (pp. 81-82),

> [self awareness] might be more accurately characterized as, also, a cultural product. For the acquisition and use of a particular language, the specific content that is given to an articulated world of objects that is built up pari passu with self-awareness, and the integration of personal experience with a concept of the nature of the self as traditionally viewed, are among the necessary conditions that make possible the emergence and functioning of human awareness as a generic aspect of human personality structure. At the same time, such cultural constituents give various colorings to this unique psychological attribute of man.

Mead, of course, would agree, and add that self is a social product (1932, p. 155)

> ...Only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activity or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he as developed.

And from Orville Brim (1976, p. 243),

> The most complete use of the general concept of the "sense of self" must include the experience of primary affect, not mediated by symbols or concepts--something like a lizard lying on a flat rock in the sun. But that portion of the sense of self which is theory requires some symbolism, i.e.; requires statements in the form of propositions. It will be difficult to set precise boundaries for these primary affect and symbolized theory components of the sense of self, for as we know, it is almost impossible to eliminate the ubiquitous influence of society in labeling all our experiences from birth on... .

To be a self is to have self-awareness, which objectifies oneself by use of culturally-provided symbol systems, making the self a cultural product.

Still more implications are to be made. Among all selves must be an idea of what a self - or person, in most cases - is. John Shotter notes that despite the variety of ways people represent themselves (1981, p. 280),

> ...we can still feel reasonably safe in saying that, none the less, a concept of personhood exists in recognizable form in all human groups; it is, Geertz...maintains, a cultural universal, a substantive universal of a people's common sense.

Similarly, G.G. Harris, claims that every religion contains an image of personhood (1978).

Another implication - one which leads us to a source of considerable debate and confusion in the social sciences - is about the nature of the boundaries of the self. Ernst Cassirer, a philosopher of symbolic forms, claimed that (1955, Vol. 2, p. 156)

> ...the crucial achievement of every symbolic form lies precisely in the fact that it does not <u>have</u> the limit between I and reality as pre-existent and established for all time but must itself create this line - and that each fundamental form creates it <u>in a different way</u>.

Again, we must entertain a cultural contribution to this original split in consciousness, a conclusion supported both by induction and ethnographic observation. Self-awareness necessitates an awareness of other-than-self for, as Benveniste stated (1971, p. 225, cited in Crapanzano, 1980, p. 17), "consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast." About this line between subjective and objective, Hallowell claims (1955, p. 84)

> This categorical distinction, and the polarity it implies, becomes one of the fundamental axes among which the psychological field of the individual is structured for action in every culture. This phenomenon may be thought of as generic. Where differential cultural factors enter the picture is in the varied patterns which the environmental field may take when viewed from the standpoint of the self. Since the self is also partly a cultural product, the field of behavior that is appropriate for the activities of <u>particular</u> selves in <u>their</u> world of culturally defined objects is not by any means precisely coordinate with any absolute polarity of subjectivity - objectivity that is definable.

The fact that the domain of self is a culturally-influenced variable has significance in a number of areas of ethnopsychology, as we will see.

Hallowell's concept of the "behavioral environment" provides a vantage point from which to consider an individual's behavior within the context of his entire social-cultural-psychological reality. Because much within this context, too, is symbolically constituted, Hallowell need make no advance claims about what is "real" as distinct from "subjective". He states (1955, p. 87) "...culturally reified objects in the behavioral environment may have functions that can be shown to be directly related to the needs, motivations, and goals of the self."

All of which brings us to a consideration of cases, prefaced by some cautionary words on method. In theory, all but the "primary affect," Brim's "lizzard on a flat rock" (or pure, unconceptualized receptivity -"ultimate unity", as Cassirer would have it) is subject to variations across cultures and societies. Potentially anything which is conceived might be considered a significant part of the self. In reality, the range of variation is not so vast, but the problem remains of what, within the complex and variegated realm of human experience, is the proper focus of attention? Some describe salient constructs recognized by the subjects themselves, reporting a psychology as it is understood and used (for example, Geertz, 1975, on Java). Some (such as Kakar, 1968, 1979, Simon, 1978 and Marriot and Inden, 1977) use textual material from written traditions either to garner knowledge about normative pressures or as simple emendations to a descriptive account of personhood. Others, (like Moore, 1973, Straus 1977, 1980) look to the image of the "good man" (Robbins, 1973) for a cultural prototype of virtue. Hallowell (1955) used projective tests though their use has declined. While many use linguistic evidence (for instance, Straus, 1980, 1977,

G. White, n.d.), Fogelson (1980) warns that over-reliance on linguistic evidence may succumb to the falacy that something unnamed does not exist, thereby excluding categories of experience which are out-of-awareness. Indeed, some (including Levy, 1973, LeVine, 1981 and Hay, 1977) seriously consider pre-conscious and unconscious categories legitimate and essential areas of attention. Plath (1980) draws on personal narratives, both real and fictional, to illustrate dilemmas of adult life. Some attempt to translate indigenous terms into the categories provided by Indo-European language (Howell, 1981, Leff, 1981). Unlike Levy (1973), who assumes classification terms of emotion refer to "real", independent underlying psychological states, Needham cautions that the gap between language and those states is precariously wide: Rosaldo (1980), Lutz (n.d.) and many others take the position that terms in use constitute and organize what is psychologically existent, and need not be compared to an imagined independent psychological substratum. LeVine (1979) seeks confirmation of self-representations in the congruence of their expression at various levels of public and private life. All in all, attention is variously paid to ritual, individual self-representation, collective self-representation, emotions, lexical systems, ideals, indentiy, kinship and many other topics.

The upshot of this is to raise serious doubt about the comparability of ethnopsychologies due to the incomparability of methods and diversity of focus. These are not strictly controlled scientific trials, but messy accounts of often inconsistent and, at times, disturbingly unfamiliar systems of thought. Nor are they in any way exhaustive. While most ethnographers choose an area of indigenous importance, aspects of self stressed in Bali may not exist in recognizable form in Ghana. Additionally, cultures vary in the degree of

elaboration in their ethnopsychologies. Some are actually engaged in speculation about character: others are only minimally introspective or interested in the "why" of another's behavior. Consequently, one must be alert to the danger that what we study has perhaps as much to doe with the ethnographers as the ethnographies.

One more caveat must be noted: all ethnographic observations are implicitly or explicitly made by contrast with the ethnographers own conception, here typically Western and American. What is most readily observed is often that which is most markedly different. Consequently, Western concepts of self stand as a visible or implicit backdrop to ethnographic observations. This may enable us to view our own assumptions more clearly. It also shapes the categories we are prepared to see in others. For example, the ubiquity of radically different views of the relation of the individual to the collective among less differentiated societies speaks more to the uniqueness and abberance of the Western self against most other cultures' views through most of recorded history.

Now, to cases. The dimensions along which ethnopsychologies vary are innumerable. Those illustrated here are those accompanied by evidence in the ethnographic record. The relation or boundary between self and environment offers an opportunity to glimpse culturally patterned beliefs.

Durkheim, Mauss, and Levi-Bruhl felt "primitive man" is so embedded in society that he was incapable of articulating the idea of a separate, distinct individual apart from it, a generalization from afar which demands further examination in light of more recent work. A somewhat romantic variant

of this position is made by Mary Douglas, who emphasized the degree of embeddedness within primitive societies (1966, p. 81);

> In such a universe the elemental forces are seen as linked so closely to individual human beings that we can hardly speak of an external, physical environment. Each individual carries within himself such close links with the universe that he is like the centre of a magnetic field of force...even powers which are taken to be thoroughly impersonal are held to be reacting directly to the behavior of individual humans.

If a self does not stand out agains the background of all else, they jointly operate in an inter penetrating organic whole.

We must ask of our samples several questions about this supposed lack of contrast. First, where does the self leave off and the other begin? What is the nature of the boundary? Does it admit of an easy flow of exchange with its environment, much like a semi-permeable membrane? Does a strong sense of individuality always stand in opposition to one's role within a group? Given that self is formed in part by an internalization of social activity, how distinct and autonomous can one become? John Shotter (1981) asks if humans represent themselves in many ways in different cultures in relation with things other than self, and are formed in certain basic ways by the culture of those around them,

> ...and most outcomes of action in a social world are outcomes of joint action, then rather than individuals, why not take particular interpersonal relations as the units of productive action in a society... .

Including, for instance, the clan, the family, dyads, etc.? Though Shotter goes on to answer his own questions on the basis of society's need for its

members to monitor their own activity for the perpetuation of a moral order, one might ask if some ethnopsychologies and ethnosociologies don't themselves give ontological primacy to superorganic or suborganic units of action and understanding.

In her investigation of ethnopsychology of the Northern Cheyenne, Terry Straus (1977, 1980) described four aspects of the person. They include; 1) ametane, the physical aspect, on which the three remaining, non-physical aspects are temporarily, and decreasingly, dependent. It is not unique to humans, and serves as a shelter to a self which is not bound to it; 2)omotome, roughly a "soul", associated with a capacity for speech which marks validation of a child as human. It also corresponds to one's access to power through acquiring the Word, and thus, one's place in the hierachy; 3) mahta?sooma stores knowledge and experience and develops into conscousness of the moral order. It is initially undifferentiated, but develops on the basis of two dichotomous qualities, which provide a typology of personalities, (which are developmentally "staged", and will be discussed later); 4) lastly, mahtsehestah, heart, is the seat of ethnic identity and deep motivation. The heart is also the source of connection between Cheyenne, and the seat of evil, a condition following from the failure of that connection. This relationship is itself the major motivation for action, as all tribe members have deep claims on one another. Individuality exists, but not in distinguishing oneself from the group, for without the group one is lost and unimaginably lonely. Tribe members are like "the poles of a tipi", differing in appearance and attitude, but all leaning toward the center, looking twoard the same heart. The Cheyenne

word for themselves, Tsetsehestahase, means "those who are hearted alike". So tied are they by shared blood that their behavior is heavily dependent on every other Cheyenne, resulting in difficulty in anticipating one's own actions.

The Canaque of Melanesia have a more radical non-individualistic view of self. Leenhardt posits perspectives on which selfhood tests; one, the implicit and existential, is based in his belief that the Canaque are pre-individual, in an evolutionary sense, and remain "personages," constituted by participation in mythic modes of consciousness. A second, relational perspective stipulates personhood as the point of conjunction of relationships with others. He writes (1979, p. 154),

> Their social reality is not in their body but in this empty place where they have their names and which corresponds to a relationship (the first name of each child is a term of position: Kapo, Tiano: the infant and so forth).

Specific names reflect specific relationships, and no name includes a person entirely. A self is not known in itself, but only by the space created for it by a circle of names and relationships. Ancestral names are recycled after several generations, effectively restoring their original carriers to Kamo, to life. In death, or madness, one is deprived of a social role, and becomes defunct and disaffiliated. Even being alone is a threat to one's being, and is avoided. In a group of young men, all share the same personage.

This view of personages agrees with Levy-Bruhl that the development of a possible self and social order is conditioned by "participation" with the natural world, through totemism.

Contrary to Durkeim's thesis, this emphasis on the attenuation of the individual in lieu of collective identity is not reserved for pre-industrial, relatively undifferentiated societies. In an article on central values in Japanese psychotherapy, Takao Murase (1982) claims successful psychotherapy is marked by an increased sense of relationship, a diminution of egocentrism (p. 320),

> It can be said that self-realization in Japanese traditional culture is achieved only by the minimization of self.

The "etiology" of suffering which leads one to seek treatment is a neglect of what others think and feel about oneself, as well as one's effect on others. Sunao, the central value in psychotherapy, is, interpersonally speaking, to be obedient, docile, accepting, passive and dependent, unagressive and unautonomous, in harmony with the social environment. Intrapersonally it entails being smooth, relaxed, flexible, gentle, mild, free of conflict, without preconceptions, bias or distortion. It is a quality associated originally with the mind of early childhood, when ego is incipient. Adult sunao must be carefully cultivated.

Paradoxically, the self of Morita and Naikan therapies is realized and revealed only by the minimization of self and one's subordination to responsibilities to the group and family.

In Bali, the mitigation of the individual self is not complemented by such deliberate commitment to the larger corporate society. However, the culturally prescribed avoidance of the naked display of self is accompanied by culturally-provided curtains of social identity. Geertz (1966) described

the avoidance among Balinese of Lek, a shame unrelated to transgressions, stimulated by being caught metaphorically naked of the many symbolic costumes used to hide from face-to-face immediacy. So well staged is ceremony and interaction that persons ideally need never be exposed as individuals, without a role or script. Lek, a sort of stage fright, occurs when appearance gives way to the actual.

The organization of time, conduct, and nomenclature all conspire to subordinate psychological, biological, or historical aspects of individuality to ready-made identities. Regarding nomenclature, Geertz describes six sorts of labels for person-identification. Personal names, largely given to children at age 105 days, remain for a lifetime. They have little relation to kinship, bear no repetition within a community, imply no membership, often mean nothing, and are rarely used. Birth order names, given at birth, go only till the fourth child is born, then start over, even counting stillborns. This name is retained through life, and is often used to embarass an adult. Birth order is not associated with any particular traits, so these names convey not hint of ascribed characteristics. Kinship terms are used only in reference to an absent third person, and then only rarely. They are never used in direct address. These names classify by generation, and persons three generations above or below a speaker are the same. Hence, one is identified nominally with the most distant relative he is likely to know. These terms do suggest norms of respect of limited significance. If ego's Kumpi (great-grandparent) dies, ego, normally expected to show respect to seniors, need not obey, for they are ritually the

same age. Tekonyms are used as the main terms of address. In this system, parents are named after a first born child. The name "father of (firstborn)" sticks until a grandchild is born. Thus, one's primary name of address may change three times in a life. This system relates a husband and wife by reference to a common child, and underlines the significance of children. Without a teknonym, one remains ineligible for public office, for his name casts him permanently as a dependent minor. These names also signify numbers of generations, highlighting the predominant importance of social regenesis over numbers of offspring. Status titles relate to caste membership, and reflect a hierarchy of no significance to social structure. Caste dictates public display of deference, and is a "pure prestige system", religious in origin but divorced from wealth, power or moral position. It is unaffected by behavior. This set of names is blind to historical or individual factors, and is founded in impersonal and immortal categories derived from the Hindu varna system. Lastly, public titles refer to occupational status, and distinguish between civil and domestic roles. In the public arena, activity is organized in separate, overlapping corporate groups around temple duties, politics, irrigation units, hamlets, etc. Each bestows such titles which denote stewardship.

This multiplicity of names, taken together, finally loses the "real" individual in catalogue of special-purpose labels. The effect is finally depersonalizing.

On Santa Isabel in the Solomon Islands, leadership was traditionally (in pre-Christian times) based on personal reputation earned in warfare and other public activity. Leaders were thought to be protected by powerful

spirits, who legitimized their authority. Because the personalities of leaders is an indigenous area of interest, most studies have followed suit. Geoffrey White (n.d.) cites Read's (1959) description of the ideal masculine type as exemplifying "strongness", and "bigness", valued quantities among warriors but likely too aggressive, overbearing, and compulsive for leadership. Such strength is negatively valued as it connotes haughtiness and self-aggrandizement in a leader of questionable legitimacy. The dilemma, then, is for a leader to be strong, a man with "ability to do anything" without being cast as haughty, or "following one's own mind," which is lazy, selfish, and poses a risk to the larger community. White analyzed the taxonomy of person terms in the A'ara language, and found that the most commonly used trait terms are organized around two dimensions of solidarity vs. conflict and dominance vs. submission, dimensions which are basically interpersonal in nature. "Badness" in the natrual world is always associated with harm or conflict in the social arena, caused by individuals acting in a manner characterized by the negative pole of these dimensions. Thus, a strong leader is regarded ambivalently.

Niwa, or "mind" among Lohorung Rai of Eastern Nepal is seen as an acquired social product and a prerequisite for participation in Lohorung society (Hardman, 1981). An adult who behaves according to whims and desires is though to lose Niwa. It is coordinate with social awareness and an acceptance of one's need for disciplined action. Individuals have a different Niwa, allowing for individual differences. The term is used to account for untoward or angry behavior when it is conceived as being in control of a person's actions.

It is often in conflict with other aspects of the person. Niwa can also be interfered with by ancestral spirits. While non-conforming behavior can be accounted for by such outside interference with Niwa, it remains a quality which is continuous from the individual to the outside world: it is both actor and acted upon. In its operation, it reflects human motivation as both a product of intrapsychic conflict, and accomodation to and influence by environmental and social exigencies. Its vicissitudes account for collective conformity and supression of impulse as well as individual character.

In arguing for the variety of psychologies cross-culturally, Rom Harre' (1981) focuses on Maori and Eskimo examples. He draws on linguistic and behavioral evidence to emphasize the Eskimo's lack of a strong sense of personal identity. While their language recognizes possession and source of action, as well as distinguishing between one, two and more than two persons, it lacks a system of lexical items connoting self-reference and self-emphasis. For example, "I hear him" would be rendered literally as "his making of a sound with reference to me" (p. 84). Citing diverse sources on behavior Harre' notes the degree to which Eskimos seem influenced by others' feelings and, how in their theory of art, there is no concept of "creating" or "making" (carving is revealing latent form). Moral judgements apply to communal matters and individual action influencing them, not private or personal matters which are not in the moral domain (p. 85);

> In short, we see a complex of practices which suggest a different centering of experience from our own - a centring which is collective rather than individual, public rather than private, and extenal rather than inwardly directed... .

> ...We get a picture of a mode of psychological functioning distinctive enough to be identified as an indigenous psychology. Yet it is not so unique as to be unintelligible. Eskimo psychology, one might say, is centered at a point on the individual/communal axis that is, for us, as a Gaussian extreme.

As if in direct reply to Shotter's question about the primacy of the individual as the basic unit of psychological analysis, Dorothy Lee describes a dissenting indigenous perspective (1959, p. 128); "For the Wintu, the individual is a delimited part of society; it is society that is basic, not a plurality of individuals".

Lest these examples give the mistaken impression that individuality is everywhere attenuated in ethnopsychologies, there is ample evidence for culturally constituted individualism in primitive societies, though it is not to be mistaken with Western experience of self.

The Maori provide an interesting case. While acknowledging the strong collective identity among Maori, Harre' (1981, p. 88) claims that unlike that of the Eskimo, it provides a backdrop against which "...extravagant forms of individual identity projects are conceived and executed." He draws on Best's (1922) work in describing Maori psychological theory as centered on a system of active principles which have material expression. They include; 1) Wairu, a substantial, though variable and mobile principle of being; 2) Mauri, the physical life principle, and; 3) Hua, vitality, zest, activity. Because Mauri and Hua can also be materially represented, they can be defiled by physical encroachment. Hence the notion of Tapu, or avoidance of contact with things and beings "charged" with Mana. Harre' states (p. 88)

> And it is individuals, who, above all, become so charged with power that their dignity-preserving sanctity is treated as something physical. A test for the degree individualism within the ranks of an ordered collective is the treatment of proper names. So dear does a Maori hold this personal honour that elaborate guessing games have been devised to deal with t' e problems created by the arrival of a stranger.

Jean Smith (1981) acknowledges this tradition of self-assertion among Maori, but reiterates the "conventional" view that individual identity is predominantly a product of his inherited status and relation to the group. Though one's ability and achievement is associated with worth, he is not valued because of those values, which rather mark him in terms of his standing with ancestral spirits through whom Mana flows. Because fate and the gods are fickle, fortune and Mana can change. Because it also derives from group, their support of one's high birth reinforces his Mana. A tribal defeat can likewise diminish it.

Smith notes contradictory strains in Maori thought. A man's identity relies heavily on the group; he uses the first personal pronoun to refer to the tribe, and is conventionally considered someone only within the group. Harm to oneself could lead the group to claim reparation. Yet, in food-collection, oratory, war, leadership, and legends of heroism there is room for individualism and distinction. How are these emphases to be reconciled? Ascribed position must be supported by achievement, without which leadership is granted to a lower ranked but more effectual individual. A man of high rank and birth may need to be assertive to preserve his status. A lower status individual, such as a younger brother, may assert himself to become free of his ignominous position. Maori legend tells of exploits by a willful,

impetuous, and clever young brother. These hierarchial and individualistic trends stand in opposition to each other.

Natives ot the Marquesas Islands identify themselves as a group of distinctive people in pursuit of their own goals, not as a society. Their "ethnosociology" is phrased more as a psychology, stressing individuals and goals, not groups, rights, or laws. Production and consumption activities are organized at the household level. Extended kinship is not a powerful organizer of relationships. To be a boss of the household is valued because it allows an escape from others demands and criticism. Cooperation is valued, but autonomy is cherished. People are characterized as (Kirkpatrick, n.d., p. 11) "...resourceful actors able to adapt to the varied situations of a social world" in ways unavailable to animals or inanimate objects. While autonomy is valued, "arrogance" and self-absorption to the exclusion of situational demands is eschewed.

Hoyt Alverson (1978, pp. 5-6) takes the position that

> No human being is simply the sum of the "objective" characteristics that others have created. The experience of self results only in part from taking on the views of the others. Our knowledge of others may be based on analogy with what we know of ourselves; but our knowledge of ourselves cannot be based simply on what we imagine others know of us.
>
> The self must exist in part by virtue of the freedom or power of the individual to create meaning in the world.

His description of the Tswana of Southern Africa supports his case. They hold the belief that people's actions are not a reliable guide to their intentions. One's nature is inborn, unknowable, and inviolable. Even parental training, which molds habits, cannot overcome a person's individuality.

Conduct can be shaped to a degree by upbringing, but he can still act in accord with his own inborn qualities. Yet, fate has the final word, and events can influence conduct. Alverson quotes a Tswana as saying (p. 113) "In Setswana we say 'my thoughts are my guide'". But neither intention, thoughts, nor events can say what will happen in one's life. Alverson says (p. 113)

> Each and every person has thoughts which were given him by God, and by his ancestors, and all of these thoughts are unlike those of other people.

An informant states (pp. 113-114)

> A person's strength does not lie in the body; it lies in his ability to speak his thoughts. 'I am not strong in and of myself...I am strong in virtue of the word.' Thinking and reasoning make us different from animals. We live by rules and by law. . . . Every person is made (created) differently. Yet a person, we say, is a person by virtue of people. To be utterly alone is unthinkable. We are human because of the way we are brought up and live together with others.

Even in a world of private and inscrubtible individuals, evil is that which damages the social fabric.

A last, and somewhat anamalous, example is provided by South Indian ethnosociology. Dumont (1970) claimed that individuals are not primarily valued as individuals, as they are subordinate to the larger, more valued society. Marriott and Inden (1977, p. 232) argue that the Indian indigenous ethnosociology

> ...also holds that single persons are not ultimately individual units, instead, persons are 'dividuals', or unique composites of diverse subtle and gross substances derived ultimately from one source; and they are also divisible into separate particles that may be shared or exchanged with others.

In this system of "subindividual atomism" (p. 233), "persons and genera are thus conceived of as channelling and transforming heterogenous, ever-flowing, changing substances." Unlike former Western notions of caste which emphasized South Asian thought as concerned with the preservation of "compartments," "closed classes," and "boundaries," this description emphasizes the ultimate transiency of actors, and the "permeability" of any boundaries at all. If the term "ethnosociology" would seem to exempt these observations from comparison to psychological notions, the content of these observations would obscure even further the boundary between the two domains. As all of the above examples illustrate, social and psychological phenomena interpenetrate one another so thoroughly as to begin to suggest that the term "psychology" is a convention of Western academic social science derived from folk notions and categories.

The difficulty of determining the proper province of psychology is emphasized in considering the various ways feelings and emotions are indigenously handled. To the Hopi, not just actions affect the group (Lee, 1959, pp. 20-21);

> Thought and will and intent are at least as effective... . It is his duty to be happy, for the sake of the group, and a mind in conflict and full of anxiety brings disruption, ill-being, to the social unit, and, at a time of prayer and ceremonial, to the entire universe.

Similarly, in the Solomon Islands feelings and talk, no less than action (White, n.d., p. 19) "...reverberate throughout a web of social relations, with consequences for the well-being of self, others, and community."

Among the Ilongots, people are basically the same, but appear differently in different situations. Emotions are not features of enduring personalities formed in childhoold. Anger, thought to lie buried deep in the heart, does

not necessarily seek expression in behavior. When violent demonstrations of liget (their unique sort of anger motivating "taking heads") occur, they are related to the contingencies of the situation, and are not traced to "inner" claims of a psychological nature (Rosaldo, 1980).

The Maori treat illness and emotion as attacks upon a person, often by spirits. Emotion originates "outside", and a person has no responsibility for its arousal or abatement. Maori do, however, treat this attack as an affront, an insult demanding retaliation, or utu, "to make a return," as a gift for a gift, vengeance for an insult. In the case of grief, this is done either by violence directed against the self or violence against others. Smith (1982) describes self laceration with obsidian blades among women in mourning, as if to say (p. 151) "This is how my grief for you is attacking me." In its most extreme form, widows in mourning have committed suicide. With mourning, fear, or aroha, an overwhelming and disruptive kind of love, the focus of concern is not upon the precipitant or cause of emotion, but on (p. 150) "...the feeling of being possessed by an overwhelming and alien emotion."

Smith claims that although this violent retaliation might be cathartic (p. 151),

> I would suggest therefore that one role of ritualized grief was not so much to release emotion as to externalize it; to remove it from the private arena of subjective experience into the public one of shared activity.

Levy (1973) also notes a greater concern among Tahitians for the pain of loss in mourning than for the lost object. At another point (p. 491) he suggests that "successful integration is helped, in part, by the dissociation of organized aspects of the self." Culture supports shared dissociated contents (p. 492, f.n.), "...giving them expression and

interpretation in special, bounded contexts." For example, according to Hay (1977), the Ojibwa consciously feel powerless, and unconsciously powerful. In support of their conscious self-concept they attribute all power and anger to the Pawaganak, the "dream visitors" of the spirit world.

Both Smith and Levy seem to hold a conception, indigenous to the West, that emotion is originally subjective, "internal," an "unintended act" (Lutz, n.d.) making possible "dissociation" or "externalization" of unwanted thoughts and feelings from self, thus regarding it as a psychological fact however it is managed in other cultures. Yet, Smith states (p. 152)

> Among the Maori...it would appear that generally it was not "self" which encompassed the experience, but experience which encompassed the "self." The Maori individual was an amalgam of various independent organs of experience, and it would appear from the description of these that follows that to a significant extent these organs each reacted to external stimuli independent of the "self." Thus, Maori experience compared with our own was impersonal and objective. Because the "self" was not in control of experience, a man's experience was not felt to be integral to him; it happened in him but was not of him. A Maori individual was not so much the experiencer of his experience as the observer of it.

Indigenously conceived, emotion does not "belong" to the self, and may not properly belong in the category of Maori ethnopsychology (if, indeed, they had such a category). Existing, as they do in a "pre-Freudian" world, they have no need to "reassociate" or take ownership of emotions, or even accidents, though the Solomon Islanders and Hópi may feel personally responsible, via their feelings, for the remote ill-fortune of others, and properly consider another's sickness a psychological matter. Similarly, Lee wrote (1959, p. 134), "Most of what is other for us, is for Wintu completely or partially or upon occasion identified with the self."

Marsella (1980, cited in Lutz, n.d., p. 13) suggested that each perspective on the locus of emotion can be understood with reference to where that culture fell on a continuum between subjective versus objective epistemological orientations, the latter characterized by a combination of "individuated self-structures, abstract languages, and a lexical mode of experiencing reality" which encourages "labeling of psychological experience while other epistomological orientations do not." Lutz points out that (p. 12)

> [Marsella's] use of this particular continuum as a focus (rather than, for example, an emphasis on human versus super-human knowledge) follows, however, from a particular epistemic orientation within Western cultures.

She goes on to say that, in light of cross-cultural evidence (p. 41),

> Emotions may be grouped with moral values rather than (or as much as) with internal disruption, they may be linked with logical thoughts as much as more than internal conflict, and they may be seen as characteristics of situations or relationships rather than as the property of individuals.

Uncertainty about the boundaries of the self lead to another difficult problem, (Serge Moscovici, in Heelas and Lock, 1982, p. ix) of

> ...How to ascertain the domain of the psychological. The difficulty arises from the fact that this domain is bounded by culture and evolves with history, so varying from societies in which the individual is the psychological to those in which psychology is taken away from the human self.

Another point, with ramifications for the study of self, is the boundaries of the life-course, normally taken in the West to refer to the period between birth and death. Needless to say, this is not universally shared. A Canaque would scarcely think of "my life," as Kamo, the shared life force, is not

delineated clearly by individual personages. "Living" goes through metamorphoses, enlivening animals, vegetables, mythic beings, and humans. Because Kamo is criterial of humanity, all these forms may be invested with humanity and vitality. The body is not a unique container; a human is known not by his body, but by his air of humanity, which is "felt" (or not felt) as authentic. Without bodily support, or otherwise deprived of the "costume" of his role, he is not "dead," but defunct, a state which does not clearly discriminate between different manners of disaffiliation. The Canaque have no term for dying, nor an idea of death as nothingness. At worst, nothingness is social negation. Bao, the world of gods, is coordinate with the living. Old and wise men, too, are bao, providing further continuity with the world of the wisdom of gods, and extending kamo into nontemporal and invisible dimensions. Names, part of the Canaque "costume," are recycled, effectively investing a new person with an ancestor's personality (Leenhardt, 1979).

In like fashion, among the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria (Shelton, 1972) the dead return in cycles to the patriline. To have a powerful life force, indicated by longevity, promises one a position as a powerful ancestor. At the other end, one is not quite "human" till adulthood, and must be ritually linked to the lineage for protection.

The spirit of the Maori, called wairua, leaves a body at death and, at times, in sleep. It may behave autonomously, fighting, seeing and being seen, communicating with the living. It functions independently of the will of its possessor (Smith, 1981).

The point we consider a clinical or physical death is, for the Cherokee, the moment of loss of the "soul of consciousness." The "hepatic" soul departs a week later. The "visceral" and "osseous" souls depart a month and a year after physical death, respectively. When the hepatic soul is stolen by sorcery or witchcraft, the victim may not know he is already dead, till the loss of consciousness up to a week later (Fogelson, n.d.).

A related point, made known by Hallowell (1955) is that spirits, dream visitors, ancestral spirits, and the like may be "persons" of significance to the living, and therefore may comprise a significant aspect of the behavioral environment. Any attempt to understand the ethnopsychology of behavior must confront the psychological reality of such forces.

Most, if not all cultures appear to make a distinction between the body and the self, and in turn specify a way in which they are related. The Wintu Indians do not linguistically distinguish the body from the whole person: they are originally one, not an aggregate of limbs or parts. As Lee reports (1959, p. 124), "The Wintu does not say my head aches; he says I head ache. He does not say my hands are hot." Terms for so-called body parts are more references to locations or aspects of the whole person; Lee claims the Wintu self is identical with body parts, and does not regard them as other, so long as they are attached. The identity with body becomes a matter of possession when separated, for instance, following a haircut.

For the Northern Cheyenne, the physical and psychic are closely interrelated, though their association diminishes as the self, once developed, no longer depends on the body. The self is not bound to the body, and out-of-body experience is possible. Self is ultimately spiritual and ametane, physicality which is shared with lower animals, is the only one of four aspects of a person.

The Ojibwa feel a close connection between the body and self, to the point that harm to the body threatens to upset a vital balance between the soul and body, with larger consequences for the person's well-being. Possession of part of the body by an evil other is endangering. Yet, in death, the soul may detach itself and assume residence in an animal or another person. Death itself is a result of soul departure (though such journeys may serve healing purposes). Death is more a bodily metamorphisis initiated by the soul's departure. Though the "I" persists after bodily "death", it is not always recognizable, as outward appearances may not distinguish between pawaganak (spirits), men, or animals (Hallowell, 1955).

The body is a Bajo Ruway, the cloak of Ruway, the essential spirit, in the ethnopsychology of the Chewong of peninsular Malaysia (Howell, 1981). Loss of Ruway isaccompanied by physical death, with the exception of the Shaman's (Putao) ability to take new cloaks. In dreams, Ruway may travel in search of wayward Ruways. Ruway is common to all living beings, whether human, plants, or superhuman. In humans it is situated in the chest, and is associated with the breath. Curiously, somatic illness is described as

a departure of a non-physical spirit force, while that we consider psychological, such as feelings of anxiety and thinking, are squarely centered in the liver.

Maurice Leenhardt (1979) noted a marked lack of correspondence between the ego and the body among the Melanesians of New Caledonia. Their social reality is not located in their body but at the point of intersection of their social relationships (more on this later). While the Malanesians have a detailed terminology for surface parts, they remained largely unaware of depth anatomy. Leenhardt claims they are unaware of possessing a body of a substance distinct from the rest of the world. The body serves more as a costume designating a social role; asserted in its singularity would negate one's identity comprised relationally. Leenhardt, a missionary, attempted to increase binding between self and body, with the intention of fostering individuation.

These examples are difficult to grasp without the context of an understanding of the cultural context and the nature of self. However, we may note at least how soul travel gives cause to doubt Arthur Bentley's affirmation that a clear "inside" can be designated by the body (Bentley, 1941, quoted in Levy, 1973, pp. 470-471);

> What holds 'inner' and 'outer' apart...
> Bluntly the separater is skin; no other
> appears.... Psyches, minds, personalities,
> all belong in this class; skin is what
> holds them 'in.'

To paraphrase Kluckhohn and Murray (1948), over time each person is in some respects entirely the same person, somewhat changed, and entirely

different. Cultural ideas about the life-course reflect the ways in which an individual is expected to behave, along with corollary changes in role performance, status, rights, and responsibilities. While Western academic developmental psychology is seeking universal changes in child development and, more recently, through the entire life-course, cultural anthropology can contribute an understanding of each "developmental context" to be seen as a "unique milieu, posing a unique pattern of adaptive requirements" (Berry, 1981, p.494). In this manner we can come to understand how culturally-constituted concepts, such as self or person, emerge within the unique demands of the developmental context.

The term "culture" itself originally referred to such growth, derived, as it was, from a Latin root referring to "a tending of natural growth." Among 19th century humanists, its meaning was extended to include human natural growth. Made plural by anthropology, it referred to "...how a natural growth became standardized in different societies" (Plath, 1978, p. 135), especially as a code used to guide growth.

In all cultures, self provides an orientation to time (Hallowell, 1955), making possible a sense of self-continuity, and a means through which past experience can be organized, and future conduct anticipated. Brim wrote (1976, p. 248)

> Every person must have as a component of the self theory some hypotheses about the kind of person he can become in the future and hence must have a theory of the possibility of personal change. He would draw heavily on his culture, which has its own theories of human nature, in the form of science, myth, legend, and religious belief, and specifically has a theory about the possibility of changing human nature; this can be seen as a cultural universal, in the same sense as are theories about life after death or the origins of man.

That time must influence conceptions of development is suggested by the traditional Hindu time, in which a life-time is but a moment in a continuous cycle of rebirth. In this system, historical time is measured by the kalpa, the length of Day and Night of Brahma, the "unrolling and rolling up" of the universe. In Hindu chronology it is given as lasting 4,320,000,000 years. It is subdivided into yugas, or phases of human life of varying length (we are presently in Kali yuga, the Dark Age, which will last 432,000 years, and began in 3102 B.C.). The single life cycle, indigenously conceived, is placed in the context of kala, time and the historical period, as well as s'rama, life-stage time. One's station in life can never be considered apart from the deeds of past lives, and "progress" is marked by movement toward "moksa" over countless life-times.

Lee illustrates a very different temporal orientation: unlike the Western conception of time as lineal (1959, p. 115),

> Among the Trobrianders, what corresponds to our history is an aggregate of anecdotes, that is, unconnected points, told without respect to chronological sequence, or development, or causal relationship; with no grammatical distinction made between words referring to past events, or to present or contemplated ones.

And again (p. 117),

> Where we see a developmental line, the Trobriander sees a point, at most a swelling in value. Where we find pleasure and satisfaction in moving away from the point, change as variety or progress, the Trobriander finds it in the repetition of the known, in maintaining the point; that is, in what we call monotony.

Eliade (1954) and Cassirer (1955) describe how time is uniquely construed within "mythic consciousness," and explain the system of logic from which Trobriand time makes sense.

According to G.P. Murdock, all societies have some system of age-grading which classifies people by age, and stipulates status and roles in terms of this classification. However, cultures vary in the degree to which they have elaborated models of life-span development. For some, adulthood is a long, unchanging plateau. Others delineate time, changing responsibilities, and reciprocal obligations with great clarity. Few stipulate psychological changes of an order that characterize the formal structural-developmental theories of Piaget or Kohlberg (though Vipassana Buddhism may be an exception, with its emphasis on ordinal sequences, hierarchical structuring, and qualitative psychological shifts in psychological stage change during meditative practice). Most societies have implicit expectations of the life-course; the ethnographer's role, then, is to make them explicit. Some have formalized these expectancies into normative traditions. All provide culturally-constituted avenues to achieve a sense of identity, as well as dictate what behaviors are considered virtuous or shameful.

Straus (1977 and n.d.) describes how, among the Northern Cheyenne, the mahta?sooma (see description above) becomes differentiated over time into two dimensions, "good" versus "crazy" and "wisdom" versus "energy." Good is orderly, controlled, careful, thoughtful, proper and crazy refers to disorder, impulsivity, animal-like behavior. All exist in various admixtures in men at all times, and he is expected to discriminate the difference. The Way, as taught by cultural heroes in legend, stipulates two models of behavior; the warrior, and the peace chiefs/medicine men. The typology implies a developmental sequence; energy precedes wisdom. Each expression of power has its own appropriate life

stage or period for expression. "Crazy" behavior is tolerated - even enjoyed - among the young, but is considered deviant in old age. Inability to develop is "crazy." The behaviors which reflect these qualities are different for each sex, with more restraint expected for women, who in turn help modulate male excesses. Once both respected and derided, the "woman-hearted" transvestite, an alternate "career" for a man, is now largely an object of derision.

Motivation is thought to change over the "journey of life," in which the main opposition is between old and young, those who instruct and those who listen. Mature adults fall between them. A child is thought to be born with qualities inherited from parents, especially same-sex parents. Parental behavior, or mother's thinking during the fetal period may also influence the child. Those present at birth, especially the midwife who first touches the infant, contribute to later dispositions. After birth a child is considered ignorant, and therefore profane and vulnerable. A child's fortune may be altered by its name (given only after ignorace gives way to understanding, via speech) and ritual activity. Though the past lingers, adult behavior is not determined by childhood training, and change by personal effort is possible. Adult achievement is marked by the acquisition of power, which assures health, longevity, greater knowledge, and the ability to stay on the correct path. This power is gained by proper relationships with those of greater power, who grant or transfer it: power is not "created." Abuse of power, even accidental, may have harsh consequences, so instruction is

necessary for its safe and wise deployment. Behavior is also influenced by association with others. Adult achievement, then, is marked by power, knowledge, ability, and association. All refer to the super-ordinate value of "knowing the Way," which legitimizes personhood. As such, only adults can achieve it: children, and wayward adults (such as "contraries," deaf-mutes without language, and the insane) are liminal, outside society and the moral order. Personhood must be earned and maintained, and is easily lost.

Sudhir Kakar (.968, 1979, n.d.) is one of a few writers to set out to explicate an indigenous model of development per se. He had drawn largely on written sources, such as the Yoga Sutras, Ayurvedic medical texts, and poetic literature such as the Mahabharata, comparing them with images of the life cycle in psychoanalytic traditions. His emphasis is largely on normative trends while at times reflecting on the disparity between the presecriptive and the actual.

The ancient Indian Laws of Manu place children at the bottom of a social pyramid which is capped by the householder. They were thought to share this low station with low-caste individuals, slaves, the mentally deficient, actors, newly married women, vagrants, and the ill, a low status evident in their overly short funeral riturals. Unlike these classes of people deserving authoritarian treatment, children, women, the aged and sick were treated with indulgence and granted protection.

In Ayurvedic medical texts, child development was believed to begin with conception, which marks the birth of the "subtle body." Embryonic growth is influenced by qualities of the sperm, ovum, rasa ("organic sap" or "nutrition"), and the soul's "subtle body," its psychic qualities

determined by its previous incarnations. Psychological development begins at three or four months after conception when the child is thought to become conscious and "activated," able to communicate affects to the mother. The mother must respond by indulging her wants and cravings, which are seen as reflections of the fetus's strivings. Maternal cravings indicate the unborn's character; this connection is purportedly based on empirical observation.

These Ayurvedic texts reflect several dominant ideas about the child. First, he must be understood in the context of the mother/child unit, gradually emphasizing the latter over the former, though this connectedness continues through birth and breast-feeding. Second, basic psychological dispositions are established _in utero_; later environmental influences are of lesser significance.

According to the Mahabharata, children are valued in their own right, though boys are cherished for the merit they bring. Though conception implies a violation of ascetic ideals, children are seen as closer to God for being without desire. Unlike the Ayurveda, the father and _karma_ are thought to contribute more to the child's character than the mother.

This idealization of childhood is seen in other Sanskrit literature. Children, hardly seen as individuals, are symbols of a longing for transcendence of the separation from Godhead. _Bhakti_, or devotional yogic poetry, depicts children as exemplifying the virtues of limitless love, freedom, simplicity, spontaneity, delight, and a utopian vision of being at the center of the world. _Bhakti_ poetry depicts mothers worshipping their children as gods.

Indian tradition contains conceptions of life stages with stage-specific tasks. Kakar cites a proverb (1979, p. 24), "Treat a son like a king for the first five years, like a slave for the next ten, and like a friend thereafter." Rituals, called samskaras, occur at transition periods between stages. The Ayurveda describes 5 periods in childhood; 1) garbha, the fetal period; 2) ksheerda, birth to six months, when the child lives on mother's milk exclusively; 3) ksheerannada, six months to two years, a period in which weaning occurs; 4) bala, two to five years; 5) kumara, till age sixteen. At one month the namakarana, or naming ritural occurs, when mother and child emerge from seclusion, and the child is ceremoniously placed in father's lap. At three or four months comes nishakarmana, when the child "looks at the sun and moon" rutually introducing him to the world. Between six and nine months, he is given his first solid food, marking weaning and psychological separation, at the annaprasana ritual. Individuation is thought to be complete by three years, and is marked by chudakarana, a ritual in which hair is cut, miniature adult clothing worn, and symbiosis is symbolically terminated. At this stage socialization and discipline begin. At five to seven years one is expected to read and write, and between eight and twelve years upanayama is celebrated, marking the end of childhood and the beginning of responsibility.

Overall, the process is characterized by increasing integration into society, and an effort to counteract regressive longings and abandonment fears. The samskaras mark this progressive separation and societal assimilation. In general, the child is nurtured, not "reared." Because of the child's tie to divinity, adult/child interaction is not,

early on, concerned with socialization, but seen as an opportunity for mutual learning and pleasure. This relaxed attitude toward child care is supported by the strong hereditary bias which assures a proper epigenetic development. Socialization becomes a source of attention at about age five years, the "slave" stage mentioned in the proverb, and the father becomes more involved. Their contact is marked by restraint, to avoid fostering special loyalties.

Female children are not severed from mother at four or five years, but are gradually given increased domestic responsibility and training in the feminine role. Women remain close with their mothers through the life-course, and often form a sort of domestic, female subculture in the household.

The ideal stages of adult life are termed asrama, and are more ideal than descriptive. In this view, behavior at each stage is thought to complement the responsibilities demanded by family and society. Ideal conduct, or dharma, is conceived on two levels; the individual level (which marks progress by movement toward moksa, or release), taking into account local culture, historical factors, life stage, occupation, and an individual's inherent qualities. At a social level dharma is the stuff which binds individuals and society together. The dharma of early adulthood (or garhasthya) entail the pursuit of material (artha) and sensual (kama) gratification. Later garhasthya requires care of the family, fulfillment of obligations to one's wife, and a gradual transition away from family toward community and public affairs.

The Yoga Dharmasastras provide a picture of adult responsibilities, based on an ideal vision of the relation between man and the world. The

adult is not isolated, but embedded in a web of relationships, including a partner, parent, and a link between generations. The paradigmatic virtues of this stage are loving and caring, reflected in marriage rituals and rules which emphasize transcendence of childhood attachments in lieu of a new intimacy, stability, procreation, generativity, and support of society. His role as householder is central to this support, and a man may gain merit by acquiring and spending money.

The stages described are a prelude to a second, specialized line of spiritual development, often taken up in old age. This career is other-worldly and typically requires renunciation of family life. In yogic practices, one undergoes a sort of desocialization, withdrawal, and diminishment of social identity. The paradigmatic virtues are bliss, detachment, self-knowledge, to be association-less, undisturbable, without love, hate, fear, or longing. It is preparation for death par excellence.

This description, based on ancient or esoteric sources, helps illuminate a Hindu "vision of reality" (Kakar, n.d., p. 127) which comes to "...impose a meaning on human experience and not, as might be claimed, the discovery of absolute truth." Nor can it be claimed that these stages describe actual enduring practices. However, because these models exist in a written tradition, they no doubt exert a normative influence on how Indians think about - and move through - the life-courses.

John Kirkpatrick (n.d.) provides a less exhaustive (and admittedly incomplete) account of the life stages and crucial transition in the lives of natives of the Marquesas islands. Individuals have expectable careers, and identify stages roughly correlated with age. Kaiu or pepe are infants, ignorant of "how to play," but seen as intentional and responsive. Kids,

to'iki, are still dependent, but may wander further from the house. They are considered incapable of work, a capacity Kirkpatrick feels is central to Marquesan identity. Te po'i hou refers to young people from fifteen to twenty years old. The most significant term is taure'are'a, a stage or quality said to arise when play turns from innocent to "bad" forms, especially sexuality. It is not fixed to an age or rite of passage, but accompanies close same-sex friendships, gossiping, playing tricks, and attempts at sexual liaisons. Taure'are'a wander, and friendships are often founded on such adventures. It is a stage characterized by vivaciousness, gracefulness, mobility, and being and "errant youth." Taure'are'a is contrasted to "mature thought," which may arise at the same age; there is no way to predict whether a child will become taure'are'a or if he will outgrow it. This stage of high spirits and joy has its drawbacks. If it is not outgrown, such a youth finds himself with fewer age-mates, as many have married. Transition out of this period is uncertain and lengthy. Marriage helps, but is usually expected to be a difficult adaptation. "Mature thought" may not emerge till a second child is born. Maturity is associated with support of a household and responsible work habits. Some may have become "mature" when age-mates were becoming taure'area'a, in which case "mature thought" gradually comes to be seen as a constituent of the mature agent, not an occasional practice, response to circumstance, or mere internal disposition. Taure'are'a, continued too long, becomes disgusting, an object of derision, and difficult to maintain, especially due to the increasing difficulty of finding new sexual partners. While taure'are'a behavior is not inappropriate even for a fifty year old at feasts or other specific occasions, this is a temporary state, and is tolerated as such.

Amont Marquesans, forms of thought mark life-stages, but are not causal. Kirkpatrick writes (p. 39), "A person becomes a 'mature adult' in others' eyes, by acting as one, and is a 'mature adult' by continuing to do so. 'Thought' contributes to a person's maturity, but so do the evidence of past productive work...." Maturity is not an automatic product of epigenetic growth, but an attribution by others based on stable and responsible behavior. On identity, Kirkpatrick writes (p. 40)

> Speakers do use the life stage categories to pinpoint persons' identities, but their claims are often challenged. It is not so much in dividing a social universe into sets of actors whom all see to be similar, as in motivating action that confirms or invalidates such identifications that the life stage categories play a part in Marquesan life.

Leenhardt's account of ethnopsychology among the Canaque is short on developmental life-course markers, but illustrates how dominant metaphors create a unique construal of development. Plants, and especially trees, provide powerful images of social and civil authenticity to an individual, beginning with having one's umbilical cord buried, or "planted" with a new tree at birth. Bodily terms have their origin in plants: skin is designated by a word also meaning "bark," and flesh is described in terms equating it with "knottiness." In development, one starts "soft, like a sapling." When young he is thought incapable of certain labor because arms are "water," and only later become "hard, knotty, and woody." As in many agricultural societies, time is organized in terms of agricultural cycles, with periods corresponding to various crops.

Rosaldo's account of "knowledge and passion" among the Ilongots is too rich and subtle to be adequately depicted in a brief synopsis, though some of her observations and conclusions can be suggested. Ideas of

development are intimately tied to the experience and subsequent knowledge of "what to do" with passion. Development is marked by progress in awareness, totally lacking in an infant. A baby is unable to cope with disruption, and must rely on adults for relief. By age three or four, "knowledge" increases, as noted by the acquisition of language. They remain dependent on adults, though can now use adult commands as guidance. This "knowledge" pertains to "how to act and speak," "where to go" with feelings, and how to behave with kin. It is the basis of adult authority: before it is acquired, children fight and youth are wild, for they are not fully aware of their actions. Receptive language does not allow a five year old to make new connections or to plan, and threats are the common source of external regulation. Learning occurs through tuydek, or commands by adults regarding household duties. By eight or nine years, a child has skill in following tuydek, and his range of movement is gradually extended beyond the house. True knowledge adequate for independence, self-direction, and self-control may not occur till age fourteen or fifteen, when it is proven by skill in hunting or butchering. Until a child has this knowledge, he has no formal name, and is only called "little boy" or "little girl." Though they may have "reciprocal names" used among cohort members, a "true" name is given in the second decade of life, and may change later. One may even change one's own name, signifying independence and increased differentiation.

Individuals become true bachelors and maidens when sex-linked roles are learned and obligations for production are met, allowing elders some rest. It is a time of freedom and "energy." In the home, the young are

driven to comply with elders' demands by "fear" and "shame." This "shame" (bētang) is not shyness: it derives from slights, awareness of limitations, humility, admiration, readiness to cooperate with equals, obedience to seniors, and a suppression of violent inclinations. Though controlled by shame, young men begin to travel further from home, thereby increasing their knowledge and liget. Liget is an emotion thought to emerge from the needs and sense of relationships determining bachelors' situations. Because a bachelor can only hope to win a wife and 'amet, an enlivening spirit gained in "taking a head," young men are without a place, limited by their inability to claim an adult's knowledge. In this liminal stage liget grows, and motivates a young man to take a head, which establishes him as an energetic man, an equal to his peers, independent, potent. Established as an equal with others who have taken heads before him, he is free of his father, and is known in his own full vitality. He is now likely to take a wife and begin a garden.

The values of married adult life emphasize balance and modulation. Born into obedience and shame, developed in liget which protects his interests from abuse, he now develops a new adult form of bētang, or shame, which is now more a hesitation to dominate or offend others, for he need no longer fear slights inpugning his equality. Rosaldo writes (1980, p. 226),

> Cultural concern for freedom and independence of male hearts is complemented by 'knowledge' of the necessity of sharing and sociality. If marriage follows taking heads, the killer frees himself and 'casts off' bonds precisely at the moment in his development when diverse and energizing claims will limit his autonomous stance, commiting him to conduct rules much less by liget than by a 'knowledge' that denies the relevance of unique achievements, privileges, and deeds, and subsumes differences in talk of common kinship and cooperative ties.

Roaldo depicts youth and age as complementary, engaged in a "reciprocity of desire" (p. 155), united in assuring that young men will grow into adulthood, and that through killing, youth will win for all the violent joys elders once realized. Youth explore; age "cuts off," limits, and confines. Youth have a sense of expansiveness, ornamental splendor, and competence; age are happy for "stopping," becoming still and content. Youth are quick to show disruptive anger; age is "knowing," and enjoy the gifts of family, respect, reputation, and nostalgia for liget. Youth and age are psychologically incomplete without each other.

It should be evident by now that self and its development are deeply entangled in culture at many levels. Self is not effectively separable from language used to talk about it. It has ties to a society's kinship structure, culturally salient role assignments, history, conceptions of time, religious beliefs, economic factors, and characteristic cognitive styles. One could make a case for self as constituted by, or mediating between institutions and identify. Because it has such fuzzy outer edges, moving from self to not-self crosses an indistinct area where things, feelings, and events are potentially claimed by multiple domains. Sociocultural forms easily "penetrate" the (effectively non-existent) boundary of self: consequently, diversity in the larger public realm is reflected in the constitution of the self. Within any given culture, multiple arguments could be made for uni- or bi-directional causal relationships existing between the self and larger institutions, all with some plausibility. However, as Geertz put it (1966, pp. 65-66),

> Not everything is connected to everything else with equal directness, not everything plays immediately into or against everything else. At the very least such universal primary

interconnection has to be empirically demonstrated,
not just, as so often has been the case, axiomatically assumed.

What has been demonstrated here? If this walk through indigenous psychologies cannot be taken as "proof" of the universality of self as a category of experience, it is at least strong evidence that to provisionally assume its ubiquity and target it for description and analysis yields significant patterning which is consistent with other cultural patterns. If we cannot reliably analyze self cross-culturally (to arrive at that which is a substantial universal, versus that which is a matter of convention), the task at this stage is to view self and its development within its own cultural context. From this perspective it should also be evident that variations among developmental conceptions are not easily reducible, and must be accepted as further powerful evidence of cultural diversity at the psychological level.

If the remarkable variations seen in the cultural patterning of the life-course are not to stop us in our tracks with overwhelming and apparently incomparable information, what sort of coherence can be brought to bear on the material without sacrificing its uniqueness and complexity? While the life-course is built around a limited number of biological universals such as the helplessness of infancy and senility, puberty, and death, it is lived, experienced, and construed in terms of meaningful symbols not ultimately determined by those events. Psychological reality is constructed by the process of understanding it. "Truth" itself cannot be understood only in itself, free of our understanding of it, a process mediated in part by metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1981). In this sense, terms used in indigenous psychologies

are not mere verbal appendages to a deeper nature, but are determinants of experience (Sapir, 1949), often functioning without the user's conscious awareness, for these concepts, terms, and metaphors are not phenomenologically separable from their intended referents. From this vantage point (Lock, 1981, p. 184), "...the assessment of the relative truths of different indigenous psychologies becomes a spurious issue."

Must Western psychology, and the folk psychologies it ostensibly informs submit to this relativizing argument, or is it elevated from the quagmire of sociocultural determinism by virtue of scientific method? To address this question it may be more fruitful to ask how indigenous conceptions of the self inform psychological theorizing. No less than other cultures, Western society carries culturally salient conceptions and representations of self. As mentioned before, ethnographic observations are implicitly or explicitly made against these contrasting beliefs. Therefore, these same ethnographers provide valuable insights into "naive" beliefs about the self in our own idiom. While there is much diversity in notions of the self, certain features are prominent.

Geertz (1977, p. 9) describes the Western conception of the person as a

> ...bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background....

This separateness and boundedness is accentuated when considered in juxtp-position with primitives. Levy-Bruhl makes this feature paramount when he says (1929, pp. 201-202),

> To our way of thinking, however complex an individual may be, his primordial and essential characteristic is that he shall be <u>one person</u>.

We are distinct for being separated, rather than persons by virtue of participation. Dorothy Lee adds (1959, p. 132),

> In our commonly held unreflective view, the self is a distinct unit, something we can name and define. We know what is the self and what is not the self: and the distinction between the two is always the same.
>
> Our own linguistic usage through the years, reveals a conception of increasingly assertive, active, and even aggressive self, as well as of an increasingly delimited self.

She notes that over time the Western self has become conceptually distinct from its encompassing situation. The self has become a subset of "mind," and the master of the body (p. 133), "...which I address, I adorn, I abuse." Self is clearly that which controls (pp. 133-134);

> The self is most nearly identified with consciousness and reason and will; and in our culture, reason and will power and consciousness - particularly self-consciousness - spell mastery and control. So here, too, we find the implication that the self is in control of the other.

The individual is set apart from his context. Feelings, knowledge, and morality, considered in other cultures to be public and shared, are private and internal matters. Read (1955, p. 280, quoted in Shweder and Bourne, 1982, p. 107) noted that in the West,

> ...the moral duties of the person are greater than any of the duties which the individual possesses as a member of society. His moral responsibilities both to himself and others, transcend the given social context, are conceived to be independent of the social ties which link him to his fellows.

The moral dutes conceived by an individual may be in conflict with social demands. This contrasts markedly with, for example, a Confucianist Chinese, for whom no genuine moral disharmony between individual and society is imaginable; introspection must necessarily lead to an affirmation of a clear and consensual order (Theodore de Bary, 1970).

An individual is valued not for his deeds or accomplishments, but because he is an individual. In the West, as Dumont noted (1970), each man is a particular incarnation of abstract humanity, or in the words of Shweder and Bourne (1982, p. 129), "...a monadic replica of general humanity." They claim,

> A kind of sacred personalized self is developed and the individual qua individual is seen as inviolate, a supreme value in and

> of itself. The "self" becomes an object of interest per se. Free to undertake projects of personal expression, personal narratives, autobiographies, diaries, mirrors, separate rooms, early separation from bed, body and breast of moter, personal space - the autonomous individual imagines the incredible, that he lives within an inviolate protected region (the extended boundaries of the self) where he is "free to choose"... where what he does "is his own business."

The assumption of God-given rights to political equality, a European ideal, is extended among Americans to a militant insistence on economic and social equality; in spite of wavering commitment to welfare, under the American ideal of self-reliance (Hsu, 1972, p. 250),

> ...every individual is his own master, in control of his own destiny, and will advance and regress in society only according to his own efforts.

This American self-reliance, F. K. Hsu believes, is built upon Western values of independence, rationalism, universalistic ethics, a system of impersonal justice, and freedom, and galvanized by a fear of dependence. Although conformity runs high in contemporary United States, Hsu notes that ideological emphasis on individual excellence, initiative, and uniqueness is increasing, and even goes as far as to suggest that as a consequence of this emphasis on individuation (p. 245),

> ...marriage is on the way out because Americans tend to see intimacy between the sexes as a matter exclusively of individual satisfaction....

It is no surprise that intimacy should become problemmatic and a source of conscious concern for many people seeking psychotherapy; nor is it a surprise that narcissism is emerging as a prevalent and unique contemporary form of psychopathology (Lasch, 1978).

This conviction in the value of the person as a carrier of an autonomous, identifiable, unique, dignified self as an end in itself (as Kant would insist) seems to argue against a scientific account, which at times depicts self as

(Novak, 1970, p. 33), "...a social construct, rarely unique, and never fully autonomous, of no special value or dignity." Yet, our "scientific" psychological accounts are not discontinuous with "folk" knowledge. Gallimore wrote (1981, p. 710),

> It is regrettable but true that many of the concepts in social science are lay terms elevated to pseudoscientific status by repeated association with widely accepted operational definitions.

Crapanzano adds (n.d., p. 3)

> I want simply to emphasize the degree to which our explicit psychologies are founded on the implicit psychological assumptions of our idiom.

The scientific model is itself part of that idiom. It leans on the dimension of objectivity/subjectivity, a distinction which is salient in both (Western) "folk" and scientific psychologies, and informs teleological ideals of development. It is an overarching construct which roughly corresponds to the categorical distinctions between body and mind, behavior and intention, thought and feeling, conscious and unconscious.

Descarte's split between mind and body rendered the body accessable to study much as an animal's body, or any piece of matter, might be studied - mechanistically, as an object. Modern experimental psychology was born into this dualism, and sought a system of psychology in techniques of physiology. For example, for Wundt, consciousness was a purely individual phenomenon (he neglected its social antecedents). The tendency to focus on "objectively verifiable facts" has been held and amplified by behavioristic psychology, which sought to avoid the danger of intersubjective verifiability inherent in studying the self; for if an object of study is so abstract that verifiability is lost, it must be excluded from science. The mind, while ostensibly capable of objective study, is evidently not considered capable of being objectively studiable.

This strict division between observer and observed was bridged somewhat by Darwin, who made it possible to provide a biological (not philosophical) account of consciousness, and Freud, who demonstrated how wishes could have somatic consequences.

Yet, the idea of objectivity has such powerful consequences for our own notion of self and its development that it deserves closer attention. Under what I shall call the "myth of objectivity" (not to imply that objectivity is somehow discredited, but to emphasize its pervasive influence as a system of meaning), it is assumed that the more closely a system of thought approaches the ideal of Western logic and scientific language, the more useful and accurate it is. A formal language based on logic and science is thought to arise from - and be qualitatively distinct from - daily discourse, which is notoriously subjective and context-dependent. In an attempt to arrive at a theory of meaning, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) elucidate some features and assumptions of this myth of objectivity; it assumes a world of objects with independent properties that we know through experience by the use of categories and concepts which correspond to objective properties; against this objective reality statements can be adjudged true or false, though error occurs and can be minimized by appeal to science; in addition, words are expected to have meanings and can convey meaning precisely; to be objective is good, for it rises above subjective bias; objectivity is equated with rationality. Furthermore, meaning is somehow disembodied, conceived to be independent of the people who use it or the situations in which it is applied. Meaning is valued insofar as it approximates truth.

In these conceptions is a hidden evolutionism and developmentalism which

has crept its way into cultural anthropology as well as academic developmental psychology. In anthropology it is easily seen in the early work of Levy-Bruhl, who claimed that the primitive makes little use of logical abstraction, though they do use mental process governed by laws making their world internally consistent. Levy-Bruhl became a relativist later in his career due in part to well-founded criticism (by, for example, Evans-Pritchard) that he over-generalized about the use of magical thought. His move away from evolutionism was also encouraged by his long relationship with Maurice Leenhardt who, though believing the Canaque also represented a developmentally primitive conception of self, demonstrated the need to understand systems of meaning against social structure and other cultural values, not in comparison with modern thought.

Mary Douglas (1966) is more explicit in her "evolutionism" when she appeals to the Kantian principle that thought advances only by freeing itself of its own subjective conditions. In pursuing such directions, she claims psychology, anthropology, and sociology are distince from indigenous psychologies.

In his study of Tahitians, Robert Levy (1973) notes that the thinking of his informants is highly embedded in its contexts, and works effectively within them, though does not challenge the context itself. In this sense, he claims (p. 269),

> ...it is not theoretical and not conducive to science nor to any of the other intellectual games which require the awareness, challenging, and reconstituting of contexts from which events take their meaning.

He notes that everyone in his sample towns think magically in some circumstances but do not constantly reside in a magic world (p. 257)

> ...in the sense that infants and some psychotics may....They do not inhabit the diffusely magical world that romantic writers had ascribed to "primitives...."

Yet, they often fail to make the sharper distinctions between the inner, private world, the social interpersonal world, and the natural world, and link presumed causes in one domain with events in another.

Robin Horton (1967) attempted to demonstrate how the function primitive thought is the same as that of modern, scientific theorizing, in its attempt to bring into coherence ostensibly unrelated events. He cautions that "pre-logical" thought of ordinary discourse confuses explanation with extraneous events, such as emotion, blurring the three domains mentioned by Levy. The limitations of such a mode can be seen from the perspective of logical and scientific thought. Horton tried to relegate differences between the personal and non-personal thought to surface distinctions concealing an underlying intellectual process. He noted that (p. 64)

> ...abstraction is as essential to the operation of traditional African religious theory as it is to that of modern Western theory, whether sociological or physical.

Contrary to Levy who claims that it is perhaps only (p. 269) "...in a world of rigorous cause and effect that magic begins to be banished...," Horton claims that a split between personal and non-personal though does not naturally lead to the development of a scientific attitude.

Just as features of ethnopsychologies must be understood in their larger cultural context, so too is communication heavily reliant on an assumed shared context; even the spoken word "I" is meaningless unless tied to a particular speaker. Though thought and language may be "embedded" in primitive societies, the assumption of shared contexts as a backdrop for context-dependent speech is often valid in societies without written language, as communication is face to face, thereby allowing a speaker to take for granted a shared physical, psychological, and likely cultural context, as strictly oral languages are more geographically specific (Greenfield, 1972). Formal education and

the teaching of written language presumes the garnering of knowledge which lies outside the immediate situation, thus "de-contextualizing" information; such knowledge is less likely to be purely personal or egocentric, and allows for reflective consideration of one's beliefs as a point of view, as opposed to objective reality. However, as will be seen later, context-dependent thought may reflect a feature of a world view, rather than a cognitive habit of the uneducated.

Among Western social scientists the distinction between objective versus subjective thought seems ubiquitous, even when the differences are under attack (by, for instance, Levi-Strauss). In cultural anthropology this distinction can lead one to believe that some modes of thought are superior, some deficient: or it can lead one to presume that certain feeling states, known in their depiction by the language of scientific psychology, are universal, and therefore the adequacy of a language or system of thought can be measured against a standard of "what is." This naive realism, however, is problemmatic when applied to epistemologically ambiguous topics such as self, dreams, mind, memories, expectations, etc. If academic, experimental psychology has avoided self as an objective topic of study, claiming, in effect, that it cannot be adequately operationalized and objectified, developmental psychology has elevated objectivity itself to the status of the sine qua non of development.

This value is seen in Piaget's notion of formal operations, or in Kohlberg's conviction that the highest stage of moral development is characterized by ones reference to impersonal principles of justice in setting a moral course. An approximation to the Western scientific mind is the teleological endpoint

of Western developmental models in that we aspire to perfectly veridical thought which is context-free and non-egocentric. Just as some cultures appear to the evolutionist as phylogenetically primitive in their failed approximation to formal logical thought, so too do developmental psychologists often see a "parallesistic" ontogenetic movement in humans from embeddedness to self-reflectivity, from concrete to formal operations, from a failure to distinguish self from other to a refined sense of individuality and autonomy, from "magic" to logic. Differentiation is heralded as the hallmark of development, beginning with the infant's first discrimination between what is his and what is other.

While this first discrimination is likely universal, developmental psychologists often fail to recognize that what one differentiates into, that is, the conception of maturity, is patterned by culture. For example, Whiting and Child (1953) point out that societies vary widely in their goals for socialization, and that Western societies place an unusual emphasis on the individuation of the person, as reflected by the theories of Margaret Mahler (1975, 1979). Cultures such as Japan which emphasize interdependence over independence (Caudill and Plath, 1966) may interpret early social behavior as a process of establishing relationships rather than exercising individuation (LeVine, 1980). The emphasis on autonomy and individuality (seen, for example, in Levinson's 1978 study of adult men) is not a natural and inevitable product of epigenetic growth, but (Crapanzano, n.d., p. 3), "...an arrested moment in an on-going dialectical movement between self and other...." As discussed earlier, what is finally considered to belong to the domain of "self" versus "other" varies cross-culturally. Indeed, the Western assumption that the self is a fundamental, universal, logically primitive category contradicts the developmental notion of self as a constantly evolving process. In addition, the "parallelisms" (mistakenly) noted between cultural phylogeny

and psychological ontogeny fail to recognize that even in the West daily discourse does not conform to the scientific ideal of thought. As Alexander Goldenweiser points out (1933), modern mentality is not characterized exclusively by logic any more than primitive thought is entirely a-logical; modern mentality is heavily indebted to collective thought, and the law of non-contradiction holds in logic, less in psychology. The level of abstractness/concreteness of thought varies with context, including who is thinking, what is thought about, the purpose of thought (its "pragmatics"), and what is thought with - which intellectual tools (Shweder, personal communication). Many significant scientific achivements, such as the discovery of the benzine ring, were not logical deductions, but operations outside of linear, formal scientific thought (Super, 1980). The myth of objectivity, which holds that language can refer precisely to real-world referents and render them explicitly, provides a misleading standard with which to judge the ordinary, everyday communications and activity of even the "most developed" individuals, for in practice, communication rests on an assumed shared context between communicators. As social science has established, the world (especially the social world) does not present itself as divided up into a priori categories with biologically-based, perceptually given prototypes (as Berlin and Kay, 1969, would argue). Concept formation entails more than a mere matching of an event to a word; it is a highly creative act involving processes of simplification, synthesis, and generalization.

The Western ethnocentric bias in developmental psychology is rooted in its assumption that its insights apply universally, an assumption which, it is hoped, is guaranteed by scientific method. Most studies of development have been monocultural, thereby assuring the continued invisiblilty of cultural

variables, for the researcher and the researched share the same cultural background. What appear as universal, invariant sequences of development are too rarely understood in relation to ideological factors, such as a culturally provided idea of what a self is, which, as we have seen, is a primary constituent of that self. Behavior cannot be fully comprehended purely as a developmental product, but must be grasped within its behavioral environment. For example, Kohlberg's higher stages of moral development were conceived from research conducted in a culture which subscribes to a legal-judicial system and representative democracy. His model of moral development, applied to non-Western societies, may suggest a "ceiling" at the "conformist" stage at which consensus, not the impersonal principle of justice, provides a moral standard. However, moral authority in many societies rests not upon a system of law, but upon the traditional legitimacy of its leadership rooted in kinship, age, reputation, and personal answerability (Harkness, 1980). In such a system, "post-conventional" stages of moral development would be inappropriate. Kohlberg's system is highly oriented to an individualistic society in which the person, not the group, is the repository of moral judgement. In addition, his system makes morality a cognitive process; contrast this, if you will, with the Northern Cheyenne, for whom cognition and the learning of the Word is a moral process; or consider traditional Hindu India, where early development is marked by a movement away from the ground of authentic morality. Moral development is perhaps as much or more a matter of social reality and experience than a matter of cognitive development.

Western notions of the self and its development are further revealed as cultural products when viewed in historical perspective. Within Western traditions there has been a movement from man as impinged upon by forces,

to the idea of man as active and self-contained. Again, scientific method neglects the influence of changing social and intellectual convention on "empirical" observations, which reveal that notions of development covary with the ethos of the times (a full explication of the Western self as a cultural product would require a thorough historical analysis, which is beyond the scope of this essay; for more background, see Onians, 1973).

Lest the idea of the self as "de-contextualized" be overstated, it should be noted this Western belief is a matter of degree, and not an absolute and incontestably held notion. Gaines (1982) provides an illustration of divergent strands in Western culture through his study of the effect of the idea of the self and person on the interpretation of illness in clinical, popular, and professional psychiatric praxis. He looks to two emergency room psychiatric residents in a Northeastern hospital, who both hold an "empiricist" view of language - that nosological terms refer to real and independent disease entities. Both hold personal notions of the character and etiology of mental illness, and concommitant appropriate practice (evincing the values of efficiency, economy, and insight) which are valued and meaningful cultural constructs in lay and professional medical practice. Gaines describes two traditions in the West to which he gives the shorthand labels of Northern European and Mediterranean, and provides a background of ideological contributions to each. The Northern European world view is "disenchanted" (Weber's term); goals in the world are achieved by action, and effects are caused by empirically-ascertainable physical factors. This world view is linked to the Protestant reformation, and is distinguished from the Mediterranean culture area's world view which is "enchanted," and allows for either natural or

supernatural causes in the natural and social world. Unlike the monistic Protestant view of God's world as one, it has a dualistic cosmology in which the City of God is distinct from the City of Man. Both these world views have cultural heirs in the New World, and can be seen in their influence on healing systems. Most American biomedicine and psychiatry are embedded in the cultural context of the empiricist/physicalist Protestant European world-view in which disorders, individual differences, and ethnic identity are believed to have a physical basis. Folk illnesses characteristic of Mediterranean cultural heirs in the new world often carry etiologies related to bewitchment and supernatural sources.

Underlying these traditions are two notions of self. Gaines borrows Crapanzano's terms, "referential" and "indexical." The referential self is the bounded, centered, autonomous self described above. It emerges from the tradition of Protestant Europe, and has a distinct expression in assumptions about psychotherapeutic change. From this perspective, one can change oneself, largely through insight gained in experience, reflection, and interpersonal exchange. In this mode the self is seen as an empirical being always in the process of becoming, alterable, yet a consistent and coherent self-reflective entity.

The "indexical" self is (p. 182), "...perceived as constituted or 'indexed' by the contextual features of social interaction in diverse situations." An individual's diverse behaviors are not seen as inconsistent, but merely believed to reflect facets of the same person across situations. Self is felt to be constant, but its expression in interaction is multiform. The idea of self as a discrete, unique social entity is less significant as a way to account for behavior as the sense of self being created and recreated

in interaction. It is constituted by external social elements, such as family, over which one may have no control. Thus, this is not the autonomous, bounded self described by Geertz, but shares features with, for example, Leenhardt's Canaque.

These observations from ethnographies of Western culture no doubt sound familiar as they echo some of the more pronounced differences between the predominant Western psychological ethos and that of of non-Western societies. The same dichotomy is reflected among theorists within the social sciences. Compare, for example, the approach of G.H. Mead, with his emphasis on the self as a social emergent, with the autonomous, singular and individuated self of Mahler or Erikson, for whom even interpersonal relatedness is ultimately a personal and intrapsychic achievement. Even in the Oxford English Dictionary, self is given as (I3.), "That which in a person is rea ly and intrinsically he (in contradistinction to what is adventitious)... a permanent subject of successive and varying states of consciousness...." and also (4a.), "What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation, one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times...." It may be remembered that Durkheim posited two sorts of egos: roughly, a sociocultural ego that originates from outside the individual, and the psychophysical ego that is rooted more in individual gratification and sensory functioning. In Leenhardt's approach to the Canaque he identifies a relational self, which exists and is defined only in reference to interactions, and an existential self, inchoate among his informants, but gradually evolving (in part due to Leenhardt's work) in the direction of individuation, with the body as a boundary. There appears to be no escaping the apparent duality, both inter- and intraculturally, between

the contextual (or indexical) and autonomous (referential) ideas of self, at both the level of folk-expression and formal theory.

In what sense can we imagine that two selves emerge in varying proportion, dialectically constituting a particular culturally-configured self? Or is this bifurcation to be dismissed as an intellectual device springing from our own dualistic philosophical tradition? Shweder and Bourne (1982) illustrate how anthropology has attempted to account for these divergent selves as they naturally occur in distinct cultural settings. In an evolutionary interpretation, the individual who is not differentiated from his role, his immediate social context, or a collective identity is conceived to be developmentally primitive, suffering from cognitive deficits, lacking the motivation to challenge the limited setting in which their beliefs arise, bereft of adequately general and context-free linguistic tools, or somehow environmentally impoverished. This perspective provides a coherent link with our own psychology and preserves a sense of distinctiveness, though in the context of present ideas (which may after all be only recent, not necessarily better or more adapted) our judgements about these divergent cases may be misguided. A second interpretive perspective is universalism, which posits that noted differences are attributions, illusory, and insignificant by comparison with underlying similarities. Apparent differences are due more to the inadequacies of one conceptual system to capture another. This position suggests that the contrast between the contextual versus autonomous self has more to do with investigators' distress that other systems of ethnopsychology fail to make the same discriminations as we do. Universalists, like Levi-Strauss' ideas on the structure of mind, rise above survace details to emphasize likeness. Here, a sense of coherence between systems is gained, but an appreciation of what may be genuine differences is attenuated.

Shweder and Bourne reject universalism and evolutionism in favor of a relativistic interpretation which argues that the context-dependent notion of a person can be understood as an aspect of a sociocentric, "organic," and holistic conception of the relationship of individuals to society. While their initial concern is for concrete, context-dependent thinking, it has implications for one's view of self. They illustrate their case by reference to Indians of Orissa, whose personal accounts are concrete and relational, emphasizing the context of behavior, rather than the traits of the actor. The differences between Americans and Orissans with various levels of literacy, education, and socio-economic status are pronounced enough to reject a universalist hypothesis. They systematically present comparative evidence that argues against an evolutionist account which would tie the informants' concrete-relational thought with variations in cognitive skill, motivation, linguistic tools, or environmental richness, and in its place submit that the culture's world view and master metaphors shape what and how one thinks. They argue that the Orissans have intellectual tools equivalent to their American counterparts, but they place less emphasis on distinguishing person from role, on abstraction, or generalization, for the dominant culturally-provided metaphors direct their attention to particular events and behaviors "relationally conceived, and contextually appraised (p. 126)." This focus is characteristic of "holism."

Holism is described as a mode of thought with implications for the relation of the part to the whole. For instance, what is true or right for the whole is not necessarily true or right for any or all of its parts. For example, an arm can throw a football; an elbow is part of the arm; but an elbow cannot throw a football (p. 127). Diverse parts of the whole are not necessarily alike in any crucial respects. Finally, each part derives its significance and meaning in terms of its specific relationship or function

in the whole. In this perspective (p. 127), "...unit-parts change their properties when isolated from the unit-wholes...or which they are a part." Thus, an understanding of context, or of the whole, needs to be considered in trying to understand a part. For example, to ask of a Tahitian, "What is the moral value of a person," without specifying which person, or under what real or hypothetical circumstances, is akin to asking a clinical psychologist to assess the sanity of an unknown, unseen person who was highly suspicious of his neighbors.

In many non-Western cultures, holism, in conjunction with the sociocentric - versus the dominant Western egocentric - conception of individual/group relations, may help account for the apparent context-dependent quality of self. If the West searches for metaphors in the mechanistic natural sciences to apply to the social realm (for instance, Freud's use of hydraulic and structural metaphors), it hardly seems incongruous that social metaphors might be applied to render the natural world.

While holism does not "explain" the variants of self noted earlier, it places them in a larger configuration of meaning in which they seem less incomprehensible, primitive, and "other." Indeed, the self, indigenously seen as organically related to the social and natural world, makes the Western egocentric, autonomous, and private self seem more remarkable for its ostensible extrication from its social context. It is also curious that in the West the self, which is in large measure a product of collective cultural meanings, should come to conceive itself as autonomous from that same collectivity.

Early in this essay the question of the boundary of self was raised, a question we might now see in retrospect as occasioned by our use of spatial

metaphors. We might extend the metaphor a bit farther and ask if and how boundaries differ across cultures - that is, as indigenously conceived and cross-culturally reported. The data may lead to contradictory conclusions. Levy-Bruhl's description of primitive mentality suggests that individual's boundaries are plastic, and admit intimate and distant "appurtenances." Such a self might be imagined to be enormous and capable of encompassing all manner of things and events. He claims (1928, p. 152),

> The appurtenances would only be an "extension" of the personality, properly speaking, if they were not comprised in it at the outset, if the representation of the self, starting from consciousness, which would be its original home, were later to comprehend them.

Because the primitive's relation to these appurtenances is one of full identity, no genuine extension is claimed; the primitive mind is originally encompassing. In like fashion, Northern Cheyenne are selves by virtue of a shared heart. Among Solomon Islanders the reach of feeling is so great that it becomes, in effect, a public social possession, "belonging" to other selves. For the Canaque, according to Leenhardt, no boundary exists at all for the individual is so reliant on context that he is only a self when he is in relation to others; he exists in the empty space at the center of all his relationships. Given that emotions and feelings, such as aggression or grief, may be indigenously conceived as originating outside the individual in the social realm, is self enlarged for its externalization and dissociation (as Levy would argue)? From a Western perspective, both a peculiar sort of exclusion and inclusion seem to occur. Conversely, we might agree with Levy-Bruhl (p. 153) that, "It would be more correct to say that, in comparison with theirs, our individuality seems to have undergone a 'reduction,' a kind of shrinking." We might imagine the self as a clustering of dot-like things and events, dense toward the center, more diffuse with greater distance; closer elements are more

self-like, as they fall into the self's gravity; dispersed or loosely centered, a Hindu may identify self with Atman, achieving unity. The "boundary" of inclusion would be an eccentric line drawn with cultural symbols and metaphors, changing over personal and historical time, constantly negotiating the conflicting demands of collective life.

It seems certain that new metaphors must arise if we are to capture the diversity of the self, yet advance our understanding of the unity of human expression. Western metaphors and the research-paradigms they generate may prove too ethnocentric. How can we conceive the category of self in an adequately broad, yet precise way?

Self-awareness may be posited as a universal, but because consciousness is intentional, it must be aware of something, perhaps originally its carrier body, which is later unlikely to be conceived as isomorphic with self. Because pure subjectivity cannot be isolated from its intended objects, and the bifuccation is effected by (culturally provided) symbols, this aspect fails to provide an "etic" category isolable for study. It may be a necessary feature of selfhood, but is not sufficient. Thus, it eludes being captured in an Aristotelean essentialist category from which other properties may be deduced. Because self-awareness is known by contrast, and is therefore accompanied by other features, we cannot hope to establish a "monothetic" category in which all members share one feature.

Though self is at least in part a biological emergent (or perhaps more accurately, biologically dependent), one would hope some prototype (Rosch, 1975) might emerge, much like facial expressions, sex, or color categories. However, self has no perceptual basis from outside the individual.

We might simply posit a particular definition of self which would guide our research. Such an approach is used by cross-cultural psychologists with,

as one would expect, results confirming their original conception, though perhaps missing its distinctive features, or taking recourse in evolutionism to account for apparent relative deficits.

A scientific definition of self may yet be possible if we can come to know its relevant criterial attributes. Conversely, as a natural category with its basis in intuition, it may remain poorly defined, a weak candidate for scientific use. If this latter case is more fully accurate, then seeking the "real" self would be, as Wittgenstein suggested, like searching for the "real" artichoke by divesting it of its leaves (Shweder and Bourne, 1982, p. 100). At this stage in our knowledge, far more remains to be understood regarding the ways self is indigenously conceived, how it functions within its sociocultural, historical, and psychological contexts, and the "rules" by which it emerges and is expressed in distinct cultural forms.

If some universality is to be sought in this multiplicity of cultural forms, it is not in the content, which varies unimaginably; the "unity of culture" is not to be found in some absolute unity of substance to which all forms are reducible, but in the functional unity of symbols through which any substance must necessarily be found. In seeking the "rules" by which our understanding of things and events is created - the meaning of symbols in action and the purposes they serve in psychological and social life - we see in the particular a universal movement to create coherence, and in that process, see ourselves reflected.

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